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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act' provides a
procedure for defendants to collaterally chal-
lenge their conviction or sentence. The Act
provides the sole means2 of obtaining collat-
eral relief and has been broadly interpreted as
creating a unified statutory framework for re-
viewing claims that were traditionally cogniz-
able in habeas corpus. 3 The Act permits defen-
dants in custody4 to seek relief where the
conviction or sentence resulted from one or
more of the Act's specifically enumerated
errors or defects5 and the claimed error has
not been waived 6 or previously litigated 7 on
appeal or in a previous petition uider the Act.
Subject to several narrow exceptions, a peti-
tion under the Act must be filed within one
year of the date the defendant's judgment be-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law
of the Pennsylvania State University and the author
of the PENNSYLVANIA POST CoNvIcTioN Acr-PRAcncE
& PROCE rJRF (2004 ed.).
1 42 PaC.S.A. §9541 et seq.
2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9542.
3 Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721
(Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v, Chester, 733 A.2d
1242, 1250-1251 (Pa. 1999).
4 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(1).
5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(2).
r 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
7 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9544(a).
comes final.' This article reports on a new rule
of criminal procedure concerning qualifica-
tions of defense counsel that applies at all
stages of a capital case including post convic-
tion proceedings. It also reports on a number
of recent decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme and Superior Court construing provi-
sions of the Act.
NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Qualifications for Defense Counsel in Capital
Cases
Pa.R.Crim.P. 801, newly promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,9 sets minimum
uniform statewide experience and educational
standards for retained or appointed counsel
at all stages of a capital case. While the court
did not amend Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 governing the
appointment of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, a new Comment to the Rule pro-
vides that an attorney must meet the educa-
tional and experiential requirements in Rule
801 in order to be appointed in a capital PCRA
proceeding.10 Under Rule 801, the experience
standard requires that counsel be an "active
trial practitioner with a minimum of 5 years
criminal litigation experience" and have
served as lead or co-counsel in a "minimum of
8 significant cases which were tried to verdict
before a jury."11 When the appointment is for
8 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
9 Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 34, No 25, Juno 19,
2004, adopted June 4, 2004, effective November 1,
2004.
11) Although comments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure "are not part of the Rules mnd have not
been officially adopted or promulgated by the
Supreme or Superior Court" [Comments preceding
Chapter 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure], the
Superior Court has held that it is entitled to "treat
the 'Comments' as effective aids and to consider
them in interpreting the meaning of a particular rule.
..." Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 783
(Pa. Super. 1996).
11 The Comment provides that the appointing or
admitting court will deternine whether counsel had
the requisite experience by colloquy or otherwise.
The Comment further provides that an attorney may
serve as "second chair" without meeting the stan-
dards under the Rule but may not present significant
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an appeal, the experience requirement is satis-
fied if counsel has prior appellate or post-con-
viction experience in a minimum of 8 signifi-
cant cases.12 The education standard requires
that during the three year period immediately
prior to appointment or entry of appearance,
counsel "shall have completed a minimum of
18 hours of training relevant to representation
in capital cases"'13 in courses approved by the
CLE Board. The Rule provides that the CLE
Board shall "maintain and make available a
list of attorneys" who meet the educational re-
quirements of the Rule.
The educational requirements in the new
Rule will be phased in with the full 18 hours
of training not required until May 1, 2006.14
Between now and November 1, 2004, an attor-
ney must have attended at least 6 hours of
courses relevant to representation in capital
cases. Beginning November 1, 2004, an attor-
ney shall have completed a minimum of 6
hours of training in courses approved by the
CLE Board to be eligible for appointment or to
enter an appearance in a capitacase. The min-
imum number of hours of training increases to
12 for the period beginning November 1, 2005
to May 1, 2006 and, thereafter, the standard in-
creases to 18 hours.
RECENT CASES INTERPRETING THE PCRA
Ineffectiveness and the Right to Petition for
Allowance of Appeal
Ineffective assistance of counsel is a basis for
relief under the Act where counsel's act or
omission "so undermined the truth determin-
ing process that no reliable determination of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.'
Ineffectiveness claims raised in a post convic-
tion proceeding are governed by the same stan-
dard that applies when such a claim is pre-
sented on direct appeal.yi In addition to claims
of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has construed the Act
evidence or argument. Serving as "second chair" in
a homicide case counts as a trial for purposes of
experience under the Rule.
12 Rule 801 defines a "significant case" as "mur-
der, including vehicular homicide, or a felony of the
first or second degree." Pa.R.Crim.P. (1)(c).
13 Pa.R.Crim.P. 801(2)(a).
14 In Re: Order Promulgating New Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 801, etc., No.310, Criminal Procedure
Rules, Docket No. 5, Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia, June 4, 2004.
t5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(2)(ii).
16 Commonwealth v. K"imball, 724 A.2d 326, 333
(Pa. 1999) (rejecting heightened standard ftr ineffec-
tiveness in PCRA proceedings and concluding that
the language in the PCRA is the equivalent to the
prejudice requirement applied by the federal courts
to both direct and collateral review under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984)).
to allow relief where counsel is ineffective at
the penalty phase of a capital case,17 fails to
protect the defendant's right to direct appeal,i
8
or provides ineffective assistance of counsel in
a post conviction proceeding.l 9 With respect to
aihiure by counsel to protect a defendant's right
to seek discretionary review, prior to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision
in Commonwealth v. Liebel,20 the Superior
Court had denied PCRA relief holding that
such a claim was not cognizable under the Act
because it did not bear on the defendant's "ul-
timate guilt or innocence."'2' In Liebe], the
Supreme Court noted that while a defendant
did not have an automatic right to an appeal in
the Supreme Court, a defendant has a right to
seek discretionary review provided counsel
believes that the claims the defendant would
raise would not be completely frivolous.
Noting that a defendant does not have a federal
constitutional right to counsel for discre-
tionary review,22 the Court held that a defen-
dant seeking allowance of appeal is entitled to
counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P 122.23 Rely-
ing upon its decision on Commonwealth v.
Albrecht,2 4 the Court held that a rule-based
right to counsel included the concomitant
right to effective assistance of counsel and that
such a claim was cognizable under the PCRA.
The court found in Liebel that counsel's unjus-
tifled failure to file a petition for allowance of
appeal after telling his client he would do so
constitutes a "wholesale denial of counsel."25
Such a showing, the court held, satisfies the
17 Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa.
1999) (holding Legislature intended to channel all
claims through framework of PCRA thereby avoid-
ing a bifurcated system in which some claims would
be considered under habeas corpus).
'8 Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 654 (Pa.
1999).
'" Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa.
1998).
20 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003).
21 Commonwealth v. Tanner, 600 A.2d 201, 205
(Pa. Super. 1991).
22 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
23 Pa.R.Crim.P 122(C)(3) provides that "where
counsel has been assigned, such assignment shall
be effective until final judgment, including any
proceedings on direct appeal." Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 420 A.2d 1323 (Pa. 1980) (explaining that
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had long "guaranteed
that a person seeking allowance of appeal is entitled
to assistance of counsel.").
24 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1999) (rule-based right to
counsel and concomitant right to effective assistance
of counsel in PCRA proceedings).
25 825 A.2d at 636 (relying upon its decision in
Comnonwealth v. Lasky, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999)
holding that defendant was not required to demon-
strate the merits of the underlying issue he would
have raised on direct appeal where there was an
unjustified failure by counsel to perfect requested
direct appeal).
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prejudice prong of the standard governing in-
effectiveness claims and thus renders unnec-
essary a showing by Liebel that the court
would have granted review of his claims.
In post-Liebel cases, the Superior Court has
addressed the defendant's burden of establish-
ing ineffectiveness in cases other than where
counsel fails to fulfill a commitment to the
defendant to file a petition for allocatur. In
Commonwealth v. Gadsden,26 counsel in-
formed Gadsden that he would not seek dis-
cretionary review and that his representation
of Gadsden was concluded. Gadsden sought
PCRA relief reinstating his right to seek discre-
tionary review. The court held that a defendant
presents a cognizable claim of ineffectiveness
where counsel fails to consult with the defen-
dant with respect to filing a petition for al-
lowance of appeal. Consultation with the
defendant must meet the standards in Roe v.
Flores-Ortega7: counsel must advise the de-
fendant in a timely manner about the "advan-
tages and disadvantages" of seeking discre-
tionary review and make a "reasonable effort
to discover the defendant's wishes.'"28 The
court remanded the case to the PCRA court to
determine whether counsel consulted with
Gadsden and, if Gadsden asked counsel to file
a petition for allocatur, whether counsel's fail-
ure to do so was justifiable. Gadsden is entitled
to PCRA relief, the court concluded, if counsel
failed to consult adequately with him or, if
Gadsden requested counsel to seek review and
counsel "unjustifiably failed to comply."'29
In Commonwealth v. Ellison,30 direct appeal
counsel acknowledged that he knew Ellison
wanted to seek discretionary review but
claimed that he did not receive notice of the
court's order affirming judgment of sentence
and thus missed the filing date. Ellison sought
PCRA relief based upon counsel's ineffective-
ness. In applying the three prong ineffective-
ness standard," the court noted that Liebe]
eliminates the defendant's need to establish
prejudice. The court then turned to the re-
26 832 A.2d 1082 (Pa. Super. 2003).
27 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ( recognition of ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's
failure to consult with defendant about right to file a
direct appeal from judgment of sentence.)
28 Gadsden, 832 A.2d at 1087 (quoting Common-
wealth v. Touw, 781 A2d 1250,_ (Pa. Super. 2001)
summarizing the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478
(2000).
29 Gadsden, 832 A.2d at 1088. Gadsden was fol-
lowed in Commonwealth v. Cooke, 852 A.2d 340
(Pa. Super. 2004) (no evidence that defendant re-
quested discretionary review or that counsel con-
salted with the defendant regarding such review.).
30 851 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. 2004).
31 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213
(Pa. 2001).
maining prongs of the ineffectiveness stan-
dard, arguable merit and no reasonable basis
for the act or omission of counsel, and con-
cluded that the two prongs were "insepara-
ble": counsel's failure to seek discretionary
review has arguable merit if counsel had no
reasonable basis for fuiling to seek review. To
establish that counsel's omission was "unjusti.-
fied," i.e., no reasonable basis for failing to
seek review, the court held that a defendant
must show that the claims he would have
raised in a petition for allocatur "have some
level of merit, regardless of whether there are
actually "winning" arguments." 32 The court
directed the PCRA court to reinstate Ellison's
right to file a petition for allocatur nunc pro
tune after concluding that his claims were not
"completely frivolous" and that counsel's fail-
ure to seek discretionary relief was unjustified.
Ineffectiveness, Second Petitions and the
Act's One-Year Time Limitation
Prior to the one-year time limitation which
was adopted as part of the 1995 amendments
to the Act,33 in certain limited circumstances
34
the Superior Court treated a second or subse-
quent petition for post conviction relief as an
initial petition and not subject to the more
demanding standard applicable to successive
petitions.3 5 Following the enactment of the
one-year time limitation, the Superior Court
in Commonwealth v. Peterson3 6 and Common-
wealth v. Leasa 37 construed second and m-
timely petitions raising issues identical to the
first petition as al "extension" of the timely,
but previously dismissed first petition. In both
cases, an appeal was taken from the denial of
PCRA relief but the appeal was dismissed
when counsel failed to file a brief, Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Rienzi,38 the Superior Court
construed a second, untimely petition as an
"amendment" to the initial, timely petition
where the ineffectiveness claimed by Rienzi
was counsel's withdrawal of the initial peti-
tion without his consent. The rationale under-
lying both line of cases is that where counsel is
ineffective, "it is inappropriate to allow the
32 Ellison, 851 A.2d at 980-981.
33 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9645(b).
34 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 578 A.2d
422 (Pa. Super. 1990).
35 Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107 (Pa.
1988) (second or subsequent petition for post con-
viction relief will be considered only if the defen-
dant can demonstrate "that the proceedings result-
ing in his conviction were so unfair that a
miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized
can tolerate, or that he is innocent of the crimes
charged.").
36 756 A.2d 687 (Pa. Super. 2000).
37 759 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. 2000).
38 777 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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proceedings in which [ineffectiveness oc-
curred] to be binding upon the defendant's
rights."3 9 Both the "extension" and "amend-
ment" treatment of second, untimely petitions
as a continuation of the initial, timely petition
have been recently rejected by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court.
In Commonwealth v. Robinson,40 the defen-
dant filed a timely petition which was dis-
missed by the PCRA court. The Superior Court
dismissed the appeal "without prejudice to
PCRA relief" because counsel failed to file a
brief Robinson filed a second pro se petition
seeking to have appellate rights reinstated
which was dismissed by the PCRA court as
untimely. Following Robinson's third petition
which claimed appellate counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to file a brief, the PCRA court
granted Robinson the right to appeal nunc pro
tune. In rejecting the Commonwealth's argu-
ment that the appeal should be quashed
because the third petition was untimely, the
Superior Court held that to the extent that de-
fendant's serial petition either renewed issues
that were raised and rejected in his initial
petition or sought reinstatement of the initial
PCRA appeal, the third petition was an "ex-
tension" of the initial petition not subject to
the Act one-year filing period.
In reversing the Superior Court and find-
ing Robinson's third petition untimely, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the time periods
under the Act are mandatory and jurisdic-
tional in nature. Expressly disapproving the
Superior Court's decisions in Lease and
Peterson,41 the court held that treating a sec-
39 Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738
(Pa. 1989). Albert was relied upon by the court in
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 578 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa.
Super. 19901 (second petition treated as initial peti-
tion since first petition was dismissed on appeal due
to ineffectiveness of counsel),
40 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
41 Because they are based on the rationale of
Peterson and Leasa, the Superior Court's decisions
in Commonwealth v. Ceo, 812 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super.
2002) (where appointed counsel failed to act result-
ing in waiver of defendant's substantive rights, sub-
sequent petition seeking review of the same ques-
tions properly considered an "extension" of first
petition) and Commonwealth v. Rivera, 816 A.2d
282 (Pa. Super. 2003) (second untimely petition
treated as first petition where defendant was not ad-
vised of his right to appeal dismissal of first timely
petition) arguably do not survive the Supreme
Court's decision in Robinson. Less clear is the
Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Williams, 814 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 2002) in which
the court treated the defendant's second and un-
timely petition as a continuation of his first petition
because counsel appointed to represent defendant in
ond or subsequent petition as an "extension"
of the initial petition is a "fiction" not autho-
rized by the language of the statute or deci-
sional law. The court stated that once the
Superior Court dismissed defendant's appeal
for failure to file a brief, the PCRA court's order
dismissing the petition became final thirty
days following the action of the Superior
Court. Thus, the court concluded, there was
nothing for a subsequent petition to "extend."
Robinson's subsequent petitions were, there-
fore, "entirely new collateral actions" 42 subject
to the time limits of the Act. The court noted
that rather than dismissing al appeal where
counsel fails to file a brief, the Superior Court
could take other action 43 but the court could
not sanction a fiction "designed to simply cir-
cumvent the statutory time-bar."44
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Rienzi,45 the
Supreme Court rejected the Superior Court's
treatment of an untimely second petition as an
"amendment" to Rienzi's timely, initial peti-
tion where the initial petition was withdrawn
by counsel without the consent of the defen-
dant. The court stated that construing the sec-
ond petition as an "anendment" was an effort
by the Superior Court to "circumvent" the
time limits under the Act. The initial petition
could not be "amended," the court held, be-
cause the petition had been withdrawn and,
therefore, nothing was pending before the
PCRA court.46
With its decisions in Robinson and Rienzi,
the Supreme Court has again made clear that
courts have no authority to "fashion ad hoc
equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.
* , .,47 Robinson and Rienzi make clear that
his first petition had previously represented the
Commonwealth in the same case. The court con-
cluded that under such circumstances the initial pe-
tition was defective ab inito.
42 Id. at 1162.
43 The Court suggested that instead of dismissing
the appeal where counsel fails to file a brief, the
Superior Court could remand the first PCRA petition
for appropriate action in the court below, or issue a
rule to show cause upon appellate counsel.
44 837 A.2d at 1162.
45 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003).
46 Rienzi was found not controlling in Common-
wealth v. Williams, 828 A. 2d 981 (Pa. 2003) on
grounds that Williams, in contrast to the defendant
in Rienzi, was not represented at the time he filed
first petition nor when he attempted to withdraw the
petition. In addition, the PCRA court in Williams
never acted on defendant's motion to withdraw and
continued to treat the petition as viable for six years
before concluding that it had been withdrawn.
47 Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 845 (Pa.
2002) (defendant cannot pursue reinstatement of di-
rect appeal rights nunc pro tunc outside framework
of the PCRA).
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although a defendant has a rule-based right to
effective PCRA representation, 48 a defendant
has no state law remedy for lawyer error if a
second petition challenging the lawyer's per-
formance is not filed with the time limits of
the Act,49 In its recent en banc opinion in
Commonwealth v. Bennett,5" a post-Robinson
case, the Superior Court expressed frustration
about being required to deny relief where trial
and PCRA appellate counsel were ineffective.
Bennett, convicted of murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment, filed a timely PCRA peti-
tion raising issues of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel including failure to object to a defec-
tive accomplice liability charge. Following
dismissal of the petition, Bennett appealed
and counsel who had represented Bennett at
trial and who Bennett asserted in his PCRA pe-
tition was ineffective, was appointed to repre-
sent him on appeal, When counsel failed to
file a brief, the Superior Court dismissed the
appeal. After learning that his appeal had been
dismissed, Bennett filed a second petition re-
questing reinstatement of his right to appeal
based upon the ineffectiveness of PCRA appel-
late counsel. The PCRA court granted relief in
the form of restoring Bennett's right to appeal.
The Superior Court held that because
Bennett's second petition was untimely, the
PCRA court was without authority to grant re-
lief and, as a result, the Superior Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. While ac-
knowledging that the Supreme Court had con-
strued the time periods in the Act as jurisdic-
tional and not a statute of limitations subject
to equitable tolling, the court stated that
Bennett's "argument for making an equitable
exception to the PCRA time-bar"5 was strong.
There was "no question" that Bennett was en-
titled to a new trial based upon the erroneous
accomplice liability charge that counsel failed
to object to. The court noted that Bennett's co-
defendant had been awarded a new trial after
he successfully challenged the charge on ap-
peal from the denial of PCRA relief but that
Bennett was without a remedy due to "serial
ineffectiveness of counsel. 52 The court noted
that it had changed its administrative practice
of dismissing appeals when counsel fails to
48 Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 715 A.2d 420, 421-
422 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720
A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998).
49 While second petition alleging ineffectiveness
of prior PCRA counsel must be filed within the time
limits of the Act, where a petition is dismissed prior
to the appointment of counsel, the Supreme Court
has held that a subsequent counseled petition may
not be treated as an untimely second petition.
Commonwealth v. Tedford, 781 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 2001).
50 842 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. 2004).
-1 Id. at 957.
52 Id. at 959.
file a brief and now retains jurisdiction and
remands the case to the PCRA court. In this
case, however, the court had followed its prior
practice and, consequently, it was in the "un-
enviable position of denying relief where there
is no doubt that justice requires such relief."5
The court stated that its "inability to consider
equitable concerns"5 4 in light of the jurisdic-
tional nature of the time-bar resulted in an
"injustice... of constitutional magnitude" and
acknowledged that there was a "legitimate
argument that... Bennett's constitutional right
to appeal, his right to effective counsel or his
right to a writ of habeas corpus has been un-
constitutionally thwarted by the PCRA time
limitations." 55
Untimely Initial Petition and Appointment
of Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Smith,56 the Supreme
Court addressed the relationship between the
timeliness requirement of the Act 57 and
Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(B) which requires the PCRA
court to appoint counsel for an indigent defen-
dant on the defendant's first petition,59 The
question presented in Smith was whether a
defendant is entitled to counsel where the
petition is untimely. The Commonwealth con-
tended that because the timeliness require-
ments are jurisdictional, an indigent defendant
who files an initial petition more than a year
after judgment of sentence must plead and
prove one of the exceptions to the one-year
time limitation in order to qualify for court
appointed counsel under Rule 904. The court
held that while the time linmits under the Act
preclude a court from considering the merits
of an untimely petition, Rule 904 mandates ap-
pointment of counsel, even in cases where it
appears the petition is untimely, in order for
counsel to assist the indigent defendant in at-
tempting to establish an exception to the time-
bar. The court noted that without counsel, an
indigent defendant would not be aware of the
need to establish an exception to the one-year
filing period. Even in cases where the defen-
dant is aware of the time periods under the
Act, counsel is better able to investigate and
assess whether facts are sufficient to prove that
one of the exceptions applies.
53 ld,
54 Id. at 960.
5 Id.
56 818 A.2d 494 (Pa. 2003).
57 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
58 In second or subsequent petitions, appointment
of counsel is required only where the PCRA court
determines an evidentiary hearing is required or
where the interests of justice require it. PaR.Crim.P.
904(C) and (D).
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Exceptions to the Grunt Decision
In Commonwealth v. Grant,50 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reversed a long standing
rule60 requiring new counsel to raise ineffec-
tiveness of prior counsel at the first opportu-
nity, even if that first opportunity is direct
appeal and the issue was not raised and devel-
oped in the court below. Grant holds that as a
general rule, a defendant "should wait to raise
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel until col-
lateral review."61 The court noted that post-
poning ineffectiveness claims to the post con-
viction stage affords the defendant the
"opportunity to develop a factual basis for the
claim that counsel's performance" 62 did not
meet the standard for effective assistance of
counsel. Grant held that its new rule of defer-
ring consideration of claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness until the post conviction stage
applied retroactively to cases pending on di-
rect appeal where the issue of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel had been raised and pre-
served,613 The court in Grant left open the pos-
sibility that it may choose to create exceptions
to the rulerA4
In Commonwealth v. Bomar, the Supreme
Court held that Grant did not apply where de-
fendant's claims of ineffectiveness were prop-
erly raised and preserved in the trial court, In
Bomar, trial counsel withdrew following sen-
tencing and new counsel filed post-sentence
motions including claims of trial counsel inef-
fectiveness. The trial court conducted hearings
on the motions that included the testimony of
trial counsel and addressed the ineffectiveness
claims in its opinion. The court held that the
concerns that led the court to adopt the rule in
Grant did not apply here and, therefore, the in-
19 813 A.2d. 726 (Pa. 2002).
60 Commonwealth v. Dancer, 331 A.2d 435 (Pa.
1975); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687
(Pa. 1977).
61 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d at 738. In re-
jecting the old rule, the court noted numerous prob-
lems associated with identifying and presenting
an issue on appeal that was not considered by the
trial court are including tie absence of a trial court
opinion.
62 Id. at 736.
"1 See e.g. Cammonwealth v. Rosendary, 818 A. 2d
526, 529-530 (Pa. Super. 2003), Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153, 1162-1163 (Pa. Super.
2003) and Commonwealth v. Blick, 840 A.2d 1025,
1027-1028 (Pa. Super. 2004) as cases where the
claim of ineffectiveness was dismissed without prej-
udice to the defendant raising the issue in a PCRA
petition.
64 Id. at n.14. The court noted a possible exception
to the general rule where the claim involves "a com-
plete or constructive denial of counsel" or where
counsel breaches his or her duty of loyalty,
effectiveness claims were reviewable on direct
appeal.
65
Bomar was relied upon by the Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Wright.66 Wright
sought PCRA relief on the grounds that coun-
sel was ineffective in failing to file a direct ap-
peal. He also raised other claims of ineffective-
ness including counsel's failure to suppress
evidence. The PCRA court granted relief in the
form of an appeal nunc pro tunc. On appeal,
Wright renewed his claims of ineffectiveness.
The court held that the rationale of Bomar per-
mitted it to consider Wright's ineffectiveness
claim for failure to suppress evidence notwith-
standing the fact that the PCRA court did not
rule on the issue. The court concluded that be-
cause there had been a full evidentiary hearing
at which trial counsel testified, there was an
adequate record on which to assess the claim.
Moreover, dismissal of the claim pursuant to
Grant would be "judicially inefficient" as it
would merely lead to a "hearing identical to
the one that already occurred below."67
The Superior Court has also concluded that
Grant does not apply where the defendant is
sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. In
Commonwealth v. Salisbury,68 the defendant
was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment The
court noted that a defendant must be in cus-
tody to be entitled to PCRA relief"9 and that
while Salisbury's sentence had been stayed
pending appeal, there is no provision for a
mandatory stay pending collateral attack of the
sentence. Strict application of Grant, the court
concluded, would result in Salisbury being
unable to present his claim that counsel was
ineffective. Salisbury was followed in Com-
65 Bomar was distinguished in Commonwealth v.
Belak, 825 A.2d 1252, 1254 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (absence
of evidentiary record and trial court opinion where
ineffectiveness claims not raised until defendant
filed statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.Ap.1925(b)) but
followed in Cormmonwealth v. Ramos, 827 A.2d
1195, 1199 n.8 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Causey,
833 A.2d 165, 175 (Pa. Super. 2003) and Common-
wealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 795-796 (Pa. Super.
2003) (Superior Court will review claim of ineffec-
tiveness on direct appeal only where trial court has
addressed the claim on the merits after having
determined that the existing record is sufficiently
developed for resolution of the issue).
1 832 A.2d 1104 (Pa. Super. 2003).
6 1d. at 1109-1110.
1 823 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. 2003).
69 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a); Commonwealth v,
Alhborn, 683 A.2d 632 (Pa. Super. 1996) en bane,
afpd, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997) (PCRA "clearly
contemplates that the petitioner will be serving a
sentence at both the pleading and proof stages of the
proceeding" and consequently, a petitioner who has
finished serving his or her sentence is not entitled to
relief ).
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monwealth v. Ingold 70 where the defendant
was sentenced to seven days time-served 71 and
in Commonwealth v. Viglione72 where the de-
fendant was ordered to pay a fine.
Relaxed Waiver and Grant
The practice of the Supreme Court to "relax"
waiver in capital cases on direct appeal was
abrogated in Commonwealth v. Freeman.73 In
Freeman, the defendant, represented by new
counsel on direct appeal, presented a number
of claims of ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel and claims of trial court error not raised in
the trial court. Under the doctrine of relaxed
waiver, it was the court's practice to consider
claims on direct appeal in capital cases,
which, though waived, could be decided on
the basis of the record. The court held that
Grant governed the ineffectiveness claims and,
accordingly, dismissed the ineffectiveness
claims without prejudice to the defendant's
right to present the claims in a PCRA petition.
With respect to the claims of trial court error
not considered by the court below, the court
concluded that a rule similar to Grant should
apply. The court noted that some of the same
reasons that led to the Grant decision are pre-
sent when the court employs relaxed waiver in
capital cases. The court stated that the doctrine
often required the court to decide issues with-
out the benefit of a trial court opinion and to
speculate about the reasons for the judge's act
or omission. In light of the multiple concerns
about the waiver doctrine and the extensive
experience that the court has had with post-
conviction review in capital cases, the court
held that "as a general rule on capital direct
appeal, claims that were not properly raised
and preserved in the trial court are waived and
unreviewable. Such claims may be pursued
under the PCRA, as claims sounding in trial
counsel ineffectiveness, or if applicable, a
7) 823 A.2d 917 (Pa. Super. 2003).
71 See also Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571
(Pa. Super. 2003) (addressing ineffectiveness claim
on direct appeal where defendant was sentenced to
an immediate term of probation concurrent with
sentence on unrelated offense and term had expired)
and Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (reviewing ineffectiveness claim where
defendant was sentenced to 90 days). The Superior
Court distinguished Salisbury and Ingold in Com-
monwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super.
2003) (defendants sentence of 90 days imprisonment
and a concurrent term of three years probation did
not preclude him from presenting his ineffective-
ness claim in a PCRA petition) and Commonwealth
v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. 2004) (prison
term of 16 to 32 months sufficient time within which
to pursue ineffectiveness claims under the PCRA).
72 842 A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. 2004).
7 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).
statutory exception to the PCRA's waiver
provision. 74
Layered Claims of Ineffectiveness of Counsel
In Commonwealth v. McGill7 the Supreme
Court noted that its case law with respect to
preserving and proving a PCRA claim of inef-
fectiveness of counsel, other than immediate
prior counsel, had created uncertainty among
judges and lawyers. In McGill, the court set out
the "appropriate framework" for pleading and
proving such "layered" claims of ineffective-
ness. The court noted that where direct appeal
was filed before Commonwealth v. Grant76 or
where a court on direct appeal has reviewed
some claims of ineffectiveness and PCRA
counsel raises new claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness, because of the doctrine of
waiver,77 the only viable claim is one of appel-
late counsel ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the
defendant must plead in his PCRA petition
that appellate counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to raise the ineffectiveness of prior counsel
and present argument on each prong of the
Pierce7 8 standard as it relates to appellate
counsel's deficient performance. With respect
to arguable merit, the first prong of the Pierce
standard, the defendant must plead and prove
all three prongs of the Pierce standard as to
trial counsel's act or omission79: the underly-
ing claim has arguable merit, trial counsel had
no reasonable basis for the act or omission,
and that but for the act or omission of trial
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. If the defendant fails to estab-
lish the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the in-
quiry ends. If the defendant satisfies the Pierce
standard with respect to trial counsel's perfor-
mance, the defendant must next demonstrate
74 Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d at 393.
The court stated that the general rule did foreclose
the possibility that a capital defendant may be able
to describe why a waived claim is of such "primary
constitutional magnitude" that it should be re-
viewed on appeal. The court further stated that the
rule will be applied prospectively but excluded
cases already briefed or in the process of being
briefed.
75 832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003).
76 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
77 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§9543(a)(3); 9544(b).
78 786 A.2d 203 (Pa. 2001).
79 In Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 A.2d 651, 656
(Pa. 2003) the court noted that the "first prong of the
ineffectiveness analysis as to appellate counsel's
conduct-arguable merit-is best understood as a
'nested' argument" that requires the defendant to ad-
dress all three prongs of the Pierce test as to trial
counsel's act or omission to demonstrate that a lay-
ered claim of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness has
arguable merit.
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that appellate counsel did not have a reason-
able basis for failing to raise trial counsel's
ineffectiveness, Finally, the defendant must
establish prejudice as the result of appellate's
counsel's failure to raise the ineffectiveness of
trial counsel, namely that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the appeal
would have been different had appellate coun-
sel presented the claim of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel. In McGill, the court noted that
because of confusion surrounding the presen-
tation of layered claims of ineffectiveness, a re-
mand to the PCRA court may be appropriate
for cases currently in the appellate courts
where the defendant has failed to properly
plead and present such a claim. Because the
test for establishing deficient performance on
the part of trial counsel is well settled, remand,
the court noted, was not appropriate where the
defendant has failed to plead and present ar-
gument concerning ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. 8
0
DNA 7bsting
In 2002, the PCRA was amended to provide
for post-conviction DNA testing.81 Under the
amendment, a defendant in custody may seek
DNA testing on available evidence that re-
sulted in his conviction by filing a written mo-
tion with the sentencing court.8 2 After testing
is completed, the defendant may petition the
80 Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d at 1024. See
also Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 A.2d 651, 657 (Pa.
2003) (no need to remand a PCRA petition "when
the petitioner has not carried burden in relation to
the underlying claim of trial counsel's ineffective-
ness, since even if the petitioner was able to craft a
perfectly layered argument . . . . the petitioner's
claim would not entitle 1im relief ... (because) he
would never be able to establish the arguable merit
prong necessary for proving appellate counsel inef-
fectiveness") and Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851
A.2d 883 (Pa. 2004] (where "nested" claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness are lacking in merit, court
will not engage in futile act of remanding to allow
defendant to supplement pleadings with respect to
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel),
l Act of July 10, 2002, P.L. _, No 2002-109, 42
Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1 (2002).
"2 Under the amendment, the defendant must in-
ter alia establish why the evidence was not previ-
ously subjected to testing, specify the evidence to be
tested, consent to provide samples of body fluids,
and assert his innocence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(a)(1),(c)(1),(c)(2)(i).
court for post-conviction relief. 83 In Common-
wealth v. Weeks,8 4 the Superior Court affirmed
the dismissal of a PCRA petition seeking DNA
testing as untimely The court held that post-
conviction DNA testing did not "directly cre-
ate an exception" to the Act's one-year time
bar. Instead, the amendment allows a defen-
dant to seek DNA testing which could then be
used in a PCRA petition to establish new facts
in order to satisfy the newly discovered evi-
dence exception to the one-year filing pe-
riod.85 Week's petition was properly dismissed
because he filed an untimely PCRA petition
instead of a motion for DNA testing.
hi contrast to Weeks, in Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin,86 the defendant filed a motion for
DNA post-conviction testing. In affirming the
trial court's denial of the motion, the Superior
Court held that McLaughlin had waived his
right to secure DNA testing when be refused to
submit to DNA testing at the thne of trial.
The Superior Court also affirmed the denial
of DNA testing in Williams v. Erie County
District Attorney's Office.87 In Williams, the
defendant pled guilty and subsequently sought
DNA testing. The court concluded that in light
of the requirement that a defendant seeking
post-conviction DNA testing present a "prima
facie case" showing that the "identity of or par-
ticipation in the crime by the perpetrator was
at issue in the proceedings that resulted in the
applicant's conviction.. ." and that DNA test-
ing would establish the "applicant's actual
innocence,"8 8 the statute did not apply where
the defendant has pleaded guilty. In addition,
the court concluded that the statute's use of the
term "proceeding" did not "encompass negoti-
ations between the prosecution and defense
regarding plea bargains."8 9
83 Following testing, the defendant must seek
post-conviction relief within 60 days beginning on
the (late on which the defendant is notified of the
test results. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(f).
84 831 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Super. 2003).
85 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(i).
36 835 A.2d 747 (Pa. Super. 2003).
87 848 A.2d 967 (Pa. Super. 2004).
I' 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543.1(c)(31.
11 Williams v. Erie County District Attorney's
Office, 848 A.2d at 972. The court left the question
of whether other provisions of the PCRA may permit
DNA testing where to challenge the legality of a
guilty plea. The court noted that the Act permits
challenges to guilty pleas but that such challenges
are subject to the timeliness requirements of the Act
